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The issue of how category variability affects classification of novel instances is an 
important one for assessing theories of categorization, yet previous research cannot 
provide a compelling conclusion. In five experiments we re-examine some of the factors 
which are thought to affect participant performance. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants 
almost always classified the test item as belonging to the high-variability category. By 
contrast, in Experiment 3 we employed an alternative experimental paradigm, where the 
difference in variability of the two categories was less salient. In that case, participants 
tended to classify a test item as belonging to the low-variability category. Two additional 
experiments (4 and 5) explored in detail the differences between Experiments 1, 2 on the 
one hand, and 3 on the other. Some insight into the underlying psychological processes 
can be provided by computational models of categorization, and we focus on the 
continuous version of Anderson’s (1991) Rational Model, which has not been explored 
before in this context. The model predicts that test instances exactly halfway between the 
prototypes of two categories should be classified into the more variable category, 
consistent with the bulk of empirical findings. We also provided a comparison with a 
slightly reduced version of the Generalized Context Model (GCM) to show that its 
predictions are consistent with those from the Rational Model, for our stimulus sets. 
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Inter-item variability affects behavior in a number of related areas. In categorization, the 
problem is how category variability influences item classification. This is an important 
issue both because previous research has led to somewhat conflicting findings and 
because computational models of categorization make strong predictions. We discuss 
some of the general literature on variability and proceed to present the relevant data from 
categorization, which is the focus of the present study, and corresponding computational 
analyses.  
Variability plays a central role in studies of human inductive inference, where it 
has been argued that, all other things being equal, more variable, diverse evidence should 
give rise to stronger inductive arguments. This diversity principle has been highlighted in 
the philosophy of science (see for example, Bacon, 1898; Carnap, 1950; Nagel 1939; 
Horwich, 1982; Howson & Urbach, 1993) and there has been considerable experimental 
work examining the extent to which it is adhered to in our every day judgments by both 
adults (Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez & Shafir, 1990; Lopez, 1995; Lopez, Atran, 
Coley, Medin & Schaffer, 1978) and children (Carey, 1985; Lopez, Gelman, Gutheil, & 
Smith, 1992; Gutheil & Gelman, 1997; Heit & Hahn, 2001).  
The influence of diversity on inductive reasoning is likely to be related to the 
influence of diversity or variability on categorization, although this link is seldom made. 
There is evidence that infants are sensitive to variability of categories (e.g., Mareschal, 
Quinn, & French, 2002; Quinn, Eimas, & Rosenkrantz, 1993; Younger, 1985). With 
adults, it has been repeatedly reported that more variable observations promote broader or 
stronger generalizations (e.g., Rips, 1989; Stewart & Chater, 2002; Cohen, Nosofsky & 
Zaki, 2001; Fried & Holyoak, 1984; Homa & Vosburgh, 1976; Posner & Keele, 1968)—





we call this effect the category variability effect. At the same time, there is some 
evidence that more variable categories are harder to acquire (e.g., Posner, Goldsmith & 
Welton, 1967, Posner & Keele, 1968; Fried & Holyoak, 1984; Peterson, Meagher, Chait, 
& Gillie, 1973; Pothos, Edwards, & Perlman, in press). Finally, there has been some 
investigation of the effects of inter item variability on memory (e.g., Homa & Vosburgh, 
1976). Moreover, these various effects can be linked: Hahn, Bailey and Elvin (2005) 
observed effects of category variability on learning, category generalization and old/new 
recognition that could be systematically related through the exemplar-based framework 
of the Generalized Context Model (GCM; e.g., Nosofsky, 1986, 1988). Detailed 
modeling revealed that variability systematically affected sensitivity to distance in 
psychological space, and hence, similarity across these tasks. 
Our focus is the category variability effect with adults. Closer scrutiny of the 
literature reveals that, although there is  plenty of empirical evidence regarding the 
impact of category variability on classification , results are not clear cut and  
classification performance seems heavily influenced by minor, and seemingly superficial, 
methodological variations. Consequently, the main objective of the present paper is to 
identify a number of pertinent methodological manipulations and explore them further. A 
secondary objective is to examine whether an influential categorization model, 
Anderson’s (1991) Rational Model, can provide any insight into the underlying 
computational process. This model has not been explored before with respect to this 
issue, despite its clear relevance.   
A well-known experiment by Rips (1989) provides a graphic illustration. Rips 
gave participants a sparse description of an object, such as "a circular object with a 3-in. 





diameter,” and asked them to visualize it. He next asked one group of participants if it 
was more similar to a pizza or a particular coin (a US currency quarter). Most of the 
participants said that it was more similar to the quarter; presumably, the reason was that 
its diameter was closer to the diameter of the average quarter than to that of the average 
pizza. He then asked a second group of participants if it was more likely to be a pizza or a 
quarter. Most of the participants decided pizza; seemingly because pizzas are found in a 
range of diameters (i.e., they are the more variable category), hence it is more likely that 
they could include an exemplar with a 3-in diameter as well. By contrast, because the 
range of diameters in the coin category is so restricted, it seems unlikely that there would 
be exemplars of the category which deviate from the typically observed extremes. An 
earlier report of a similar effect, but with meaningless stimuli, was made by Fried and 
Holyoak (1984), who showed that participants classified checkerboard examples that 
were closer to the prototype (mean) of a lower variability category, as belonging to a 
high-variability category, which was further away.  
There have been a number of extensions to the Rips’s (1989) experiment, which 
illustrate some subtle methodological issues. Cohen, Nosofsky, and Zaki (2001) 
replicated Rips’s finding in two ways. First, they employed one-dimensional stimuli 
(vertical lines), organized into a low and a high variability category, with a test instance 
halfway between the nearest neighbors of the two categories (in the following, test 
instances halfway between the nearest neighbors of two categories will be referred to as 
NN-halfway instances, to distinguish them from test instances located halfway between 
the prototypes of the two trained categories which will be referred to as P-halfway). 
Again, it was found that increasing the variability of the high variability category favored 





classification into the high variability category (note though that the classification rate for 
the high variability category was between 29.5% and 47.1%). Second, Cohen et al. also 
examined stimuli which were color patches varying along two dimensions, brightness and 
hue (Exp. 2). In four conditions the NN-halfway test instance was always numerically 
more likely to be classified into the high variability category (though these trends were 
not always significant).   
Cohen et al. (2001) provided some interesting manipulations regarding the 
importance of category variability in classification. Two methodological issues, in 
particular, are worth highlighting. First, in their Experiment 2, Cohen et al. defined the 
low  and the high variability category  in such a way that, if participants were to classify 
the test instance in the low variability category, then there would not always be a linear 
category boundary separating the exemplars of the two categories. By contrast, if 
participants classified the test instance in the high variability category (as most of them 
did), then there was always a simple linear boundary separating the exemplars of the two 
categories (this point is immediately obvious by inspecting Figure 4 in Cohen et al.’s 
paper). There is evidence that whether a category boundary is linearly separable or not 
affects performance with the corresponding classification (e.g., Blair & Homa, 2001; 
Ruts, Storms. & Hampton, 2004). Second, in Experiment 1, the presentation frequency of 
the exemplars favored the nearest neighbors of the two categories. Given the simple, 
schematic nature of the stimuli, it is possible that this may have influenced the kind of 
categories participants extracted and perhaps distorted the representation of category 
variability. Cohen et al. had good reasons for adopting this design, but we wanted to 





study the issue of category variability on classification without these methodological 
complications.  
A related study is that of Sakamoto, Jones, and Love (2008), where participants 
saw test items which were NN-halfway; again, these test items were more likely to be 
classified into the more variable category. In Sakamoto et al.’s study the stimuli were 
lines, in a way analogous to that of Cohen et al. (2002), and the training procedure was 
that of a standard supervised categorization experiment (participants went through several 
presentations of the training stimuli, each time trying to guess their category membership 
and receiving corrective feedback). Sakamoto et al.’s results are consistent with those of 
Cohen et al., but are somewhat at odds with earlier results from Stewart and Chater’s 
(2002) Experiment 1. Stewart and Chater (in their Experiment 1) also considered NN-
halfway test instances, but manipulated format of presentation and the presence of a hint 
regarding category variability. When Stewart and Chater employed a sequential mode of 
stimulus presentation (in their Experiment 1), the probability of classification into the 
high variability category (without a corresponding hint) was only .25 (it was .37 with the 
hint). However, with simultaneous presentation of all the stimuli, this probability rose to 
.51 without a hint to participants that one category was more variable and .74 with such a 
hint. Thus, when it comes to sequential presentation of the stimuli, and NN-halfway test 
instances, there is some conflict in the literature.  
Overall, more recent research has somewhat emphasized NN-halfway test 
instances. While there are important theoretical reasons for studying NN-halfway test 
instances, it is worth noting that an NN-halfway item will actually be closer to the 
prototype of the less variable category, compared to an item which is halfway between 





the prototypes of two categories (a P-halfway item), as illustrated in Figure 1. Indeed, 
Cohen et al. (2001) found that a slightly reduced version of the GCM could not account 
for the bias to classify NN-halfway instances into the more variable category. But, it is 
also theoretically pertinent to study P-halfway instances (cf. Hahn et al., 2005). One 
reason is that the nearest neighbors between two categories may not be as important an 
aspect of category representation as, by contrast, the prototypes (note that in the Cohen et 
al., 2001, study the salience of the nearest neighbors was artificially enhanced in some 
conditions, by increasing the frequency of these items). Thus, we think that the literature 
on category variability could be usefully extended by a focused study involving P-
halfway instances and this is what we aim to achieve with the present research (taking 
into account a range of relevant methodological manipulations). Notably, some work 
indicates that the default classification bias is to place an NN-halfway exemplar into the 
high variability category (Cohen et al., 2001; Sakamoto et al., 2008), others that if 
category variability is not made salient it will be classified in the low variability category 
(Stewart & Chater, 2002). There are different ways in which variability can be made 
salient and this issue will be considered in our experiments.  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
Our understanding of empirical results can be informed by computational models 
of categorization. Indeed, many computational models of categorization are sensitive to 
the underlying distributional characteristics of the categories that are learned. So, what do 
they predict regarding P-halfway or NN-halfway instances? Note first that, as baseline 





prototype models determine the classification of novel instances only on the basis of 
category prototypes, they are blind to the effects of category variability (but see 
Vanpaemel & Storms, 2008, for extensions of prototype models). Exemplar models are, 
in principle, sensitive to category variability, since category representations typically 
involve information about all available exemplars. Cohen et al. (2001; see also Stewart & 
Chater, 2002) examined a version of the GCM with only one free parameter (the 
sensitivity parameter) and showed that the model was more consistent with classification 
of NN-halfway test instances into the low variability categories. But, as noted, the 
conclusions from this examination probably also depend on differences in relative 
frequency between category exemplars and the complexity of the category boundaries.  
Stewart and Chater (2002) examined a ‘distributional’ approach (from Ashby & 
Townsend, 1986), according to which probability distributions are used to represent 
categories and these distributions are fitted using the observed stimuli (see also Fried & 
Holyoak, 1984). On this account classification of a new exemplar is based on the relative 
likelihood of belonging to the distribution of each of the possible categories. An NN- 
halfway test item  should typically be classified into the high variability category, 
because the tight bunching of the exemplars in the low variability category means that the 
test item is more standard deviations away from the mean of that category. A similar 
analysis has recently been reported by Hsu and Griffiths (2010), who examined the 
predictions of a baseline Bayesian model of classification, based on an assumption of 
normally distributed properties. They also showed that their model favors classification 
into the more variable category. 





Stewart and Chater’s analysis of the distributional approach and Hsu and 
Griffiths’ (2010) examination of the baseline Bayesian model suggest that any 
categorization model which represents categories in terms of the probability distribution 
of their members ought to predict that a halfway instance would be classified in the more 
variable category. An important such model is Anderson’s (1991; see also Sanborn, 
Griffiths, & Navarro, 2010) Rational Model, which has come to be the most widely 
considered Bayesian model of categorization.  
While one would expect an application of the Rational Model to the problem of 
category variability to lead to conclusions consistent with those of Stewart and Chater, it 
is an important exercise to verify that this is indeed the case. Therefore, a secondary 
purpose of this work was to apply the continuous version of Anderson’s (1991; Anderson 
& Fincham, 1996) Rational Model to the problem of how category variability affects the 
classification of novel stimuli. Note that the continuous version of the Rational Model 
(which assumes items are represented with continuous dimensions) has been examined 
considerably less than the better known discrete version (which assumes that items are 
represented with discrete features).  
The Rational Model assumes that the process of categorization is one of Bayesian 
inference for novel stimuli. The key explanatory components of the Rational Model are 
the assumptions it makes regarding how experience is represented and employed when 
categorizing novel instances. Specifically, it assumes that naïve observers base their 
category extensions on  knowledge of the underlying category distributions (i.e., 
distributions of category exemplars). Thus, when a test instance is consistent with a 
category distribution, it is more likely to be classified into the category. The Rational 





Model clearly predicts that classification would favor the more variable category. Thus, 
the issue of whether participants are sensitive to category variability or not bears on 
whether participants can be assumed to encode distributional information from the 
observed instances and employ it for classification in the way prescribed by the Rational 
Model.  
More generally, examination of the Rational Model adds to the effort of 
understanding cognitive process within formal probabilistic frameworks (e.g., Busemeyer 
et al., 2011; Griffiths et al., 2010; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Tenenbaum et al., 2006; 
Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Finally, it is worth noting that there are other categorization 
models which could be applied to the category variability issue, such as the simplicity 
model (Pothos & Chater, 2002) or SUSTAIN (Love et al., 2004). Our choice to study the 
Rational Model relates primarily to the fact that, as we shall see, this model provides a 
particularly clear intuition as to why category variability should matter.  
 
 
The continuous version of the Rational Model  
Anderson’s (1991) Rational Model is an incremental, Bayesian model of unsupervised 
categorization. It assigns a new stimulus with feature structure F to whichever category k 
makes F most probable. For example, a new object that looks like a ‘cat’ would be 
assigned to the category of cats, since the feature structure of the object is most probable 
given this category membership. Specifically, the probability of classification of a novel 
instance into category k is given by the product )|()( kFPkP . 
cnc
cnkP k )1()( , 
whereby nk is the number of stimuli assigned to category k so far, n is the total number of 





classified stimuli, and c is the coupling parameter. The coupling parameter determines 
how likely it is that a new instance will be assigned to a new category. Thus, c indirectly 
determines the number of categories that the Rational Model will produce for a stimulus 
set.  
The probability that the new object comes from a new category is given by
cnc
cP   )1( 1)0( . )|( kFP is computed as i i kxf )|( , where i indexes the different 
dimensions of variation of the stimuli and x indicates the different values dimension i can 
take. That is, )|( kxfi  is the probability of displaying value x on dimension i in category 
k, and is approximated by )/11,( iiiait   , which is the t distribution with a i degrees 

















respectively, whereby ni  0 , ni  0 , n is the number of observations in 
category k, y  is their mean, and s2 is their variance. Finally, 00 1   , 0  is the 
halfway point of the range of all instances and 0  is the square of a quarter of the range. 
This particular form for the Rational Model deviates very slightly from that in the 
original Anderson (1991) paper, but the above specification was guided by John 
Anderson (personal communication; see also Pothos & Bailey, 2009, and Pothos, 2007, 
which employed the Rational Model as stated above).  
The account of the category variability effect given by the Rational Model can be 
demonstrated with a straightforward example (our experimental investigation follows 
from this example). Consider two categories; the items of one category are more variable 





than the items of the other category. Suppose next that a novel exemplar halfway between 
the prototypes (means) of each of the two categories is presented; participants would be 
asked to classify this novel exemplar in one category or the other. Deriving predictions 
regarding the classification of the intermediate item from the Rational Model is 
straightforward. The model assumes that stimuli are presented sequentially and in the 
typical application of the model stimuli cannot be pre-assigned a classification. However, 
when there are two well-separated categories, the Rational Model will typically discover 
them, regardless of order of presentation of the stimuli. Therefore, in order to derive a 
prediction for the critical intermediate item, we can first present to the Rational Model 
the exemplars from the two categories, so that it can discover the two (intended) 
categories, and subsequently present the intermediate item. Then, the classification of the 
critical test instance can be examined by presenting it last.  
As noted, the standard version of the Rational Model, as proposed by Anderson 
(1991) and applied by us, has one free parameter, c, the coupling parameter. Lower 
values of the coupling parameter make it less likely that dissimilar stimuli will be 
included in the same cluster and vice versa. The typical value of the coupling parameter 
is 0.5 and a typical range of exploring the coupling parameter, where relevant, would be 
between values close to 0 and 1. We explored predictions of the Rational Model 
regarding category variability across a range of values of the coupling parameter. The 
predictions of the Rational Model most relevant to our empirical situation correspond to 
values of the coupling parameter which lead to the intended classification. However, it is 
worth exploring the behavior of the model across several values of the coupling 
parameter anyway, to examine the robustness of a putative bias for classification into the 





more variable category. The input to the rational model was the stimulus coordinates for 
Experiment 1, as shown in Table 1a.  
As expected, when the coupling parameter was very low all (or most) stimuli 
were assigned into separate categories (c=0.1 and c=0.2). Conversely, when the coupling 
parameter was high all items were included in a single category (c=1). For c=0.3, 0.4, 
four separate groups were produced. Even though in these cases the halfway instance was 
classified into the low variability category, the low variability category was the largest 
one as well: the Rational Model has a bias favoring classification into larger categories 
(recall, Prob(category) ∝ nk, the number of items classified into the category so far). In 
any case, as noted, all these results are not relevant for our empirical situation, since the 
intended two-cluster classification was basically indicated to participants. For c= 0.5, 0.6, 
0.7, 0.8, 0.9, the Rational Model predicted the intended two-cluster partition of the 
stimuli. In all these cases, the critical test instance was classified into the more variable 
category. Thus, the Rational Model makes a robust prediction that a test instance halfway 
between two category prototypes should be assigned into the more variable category. 
This situation is unchanged if one considers a category of low variability (instead of zero 
variability) and a category of high variability (e.g., as in Experiment 3). Overall, as long 
as there are no large differences in category size, the Rational Model will predict that a P-
halfway test instance will be classified into the more variable category.  
It can be demonstrated intuitively why the rational model makes the prediction it 
does. Figure 2 shows two normal distributions with a straight line halfway between the 
means (prototypes) of the two distributions. This situation corresponds to the stimulus 
structures employed in our experiments (though in some of the experiments the low 





variability category structure has zero variability). The Rational Model works by 
examining how likely a new instance is, given membership into different candidate 
categories. A new instance is likely to be a member of a category if it is consistent with 
the distributional properties of the category. Clearly, in the figure below, the instance is 
much more likely given the left (more variable) category, than the right (see also Hsu & 
Griffiths, 2010, and Stewart and Chater, 2002). This simple, but compelling, intuition is 
the basis for the classification predictions from the Rational Model (for a related 
illustration see Mareschal et al., 2002; for other examinations of the Rational Model, see 
Pothos, 2007, Pothos & Bailey, 2009, or Sanborn et al., 2010). In fact, the situation is 
entirely analogous to that in standard independent samples t-tests for comparing two 
means. 
Note that we have chosen to examine the Rational Model in an idealized situation, 
without reference to participant data. We chose this approach mainly for two reasons. 
First, because in this way we can explore the generic model biases regarding variability 
(that is, in the absence of complications which may arise from fits to noisy participant 
data). Second, because the standard version of the Rational Model allows relatively little 
flexibility in terms of particular fits anyway (the only parameter which can be 
manipulated is the coupling parameter). Overall, the main relevant insight regarding the 
psychology of categorization from the Rational Model is that a bias to classify into the 
more variable category can arise if participants encode the distributional properties of the 
encountered instances and utilize them in a Bayesian scheme for the classification of new 
instances. It is worth stressing that the assumption that the categorization process 
involves optimal Bayesian processing is an extremely powerful and ambitious one, and 





contrasts with other influential approaches for categorization (e.g., prototype theory).  
Finally, the prediction regarding category variability from the Rational Model is robust, 
that is there do not seem to be circumstances that lead to the reversal of the prediction 
(unless there are major differences in the relative size of the categories).  
 




The first experiment was a basic test of the Rational Model prediction regarding category 
variability. In other words, we examined the prediction that a P-halfway test object will 
be classified as belonging to the high variability category. The procedure was designed to 
make any differences in category variability as salient as possible, as this appears to make 
it more likely that a critical exemplar (either halfway between the prototypes or halfway 
between the nearest neighbors) would be classified into the more variable category. This 
has been highlighted in at least three studies. For example, Smith and Sloman (1994), in 
an attempt to replicate Rips’s finding, reported that participants were more likely to 
classify an NN-halfway critical instance in the high variability category if they could be 
shown (through their verbal protocols) to be aware that one category was indeed more 
variable. Stewart and Chater (2002; Experiment 1) observed higher classification of an 
NN-halfway test instance into the more variable category if participants were told, during 
training, that one of the two categories was more variable. Finally, Sakamoto et al. (2008) 
found that a random presentation of the same stimuli in a category, made the category 





look more variable and so favored it regarding the classification of an NN-halfway 
critical instance.  
 We adopted a novel approach to the problem of making category variability 
salient. Rather than presenting to participants stimuli, we showed them a table with the 
actual dimension values out of which the stimuli were meant to be constructed. In this 
way, participants could directly see the variability in each category (all participants were 
students in a psychology department, and so would have had some experience with 
processing tables of numbers of this sort). Such an approach avoids a number of 
potentially tricky issues associated with previous studies. First, there would be no 
problem of having to establish whether the way participants represent the stimuli is the 
same way as the one assumed by the experimenter (e.g., see Cohen et al., 2001). The 
numbers presented to participants are the exact numbers used in the examinations of the 
Rational Model. Second, there are no issues arising from how well participants represent 
the differences between stimuli. Clearly, if participants fail to accurately perceive or 
represent stimulus differences, there is no point asking about whether category variability 
can affect classification (cf. Smith & Sloman, 1994). Third, it might be the case that an 
intuition about variability may be more difficult to ascertain with a small number of 
perceptual stimuli as opposed to a small set of numbers.  
 Regarding its other details, this experiment examined a P-halfway critical 
instance, rather than the nearest exemplars (Cohen et al., 2001; Stewart & Chater, 2002, 
Experiment 1; Sakamoto et al., 2008). Also, the category boundaries for the low and high 
variability categories, regardless of how the test instance was classified, were always 





simple linear ones (contrast with Cohen et al., 2001). In this way, we wanted to avoid any 
complications arising from category boundaries varying in complexity.  
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were Swansea University undergraduate students, who volunteered to take 
part in the study. Twenty two participants were presented with Table 1 (a or b). 
Procedure and stimuli  
Participants were presented with the flowing instructions:   
“A scientist in the Amazon discovered two types of spiders. The spiders are different in 
terms of length of bodies and length of legs. Nine spiders that belong to each of the two 
groups (S1 group and S2 group) are presented in one table as follows:” At that point, 
participants were shown either Table 1a or Table 1b, without the test item of course.   
The ‘a’ and ‘b’ versions of Table 1 correspond to whether the low variability category 
was called S1 or S2. We also counterbalanced whether the prototype of the low 
variability category was ‘larger’ than the prototype of the high variability category; in 
Tables 1a, 1b the prototype of the low variability category was smaller, but we also had 
an alternative set of materials in which it was larger. Participants were subsequently 
asked the following questions:  “In what group is there more variability between the 
spiders?  1. The S1 group or 2. The S2 group. A spider with 5 millimeters body and 5 
millimeters legs is from: 1. The S1 group or 2. The S2 group.”  
 As can be seen in Table 1, the low variability category consisted of repeating the 
same item several times, that is, it had zero variability. This was done as an additional 
manipulation to make the difference in variability between the two categories more 





salient. Moreover, the test instance was always exactly halfway between the prototypes of 
the two categories.  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
 All materials were presented to participants as printed sheets of paper, and 
participants indicated their answers by circling the appropriate options. The experiment 
lasted approximately five minutes.  
Results 
All of the participants answered the first question correctly; the first question was meant 
to both increase the salience of category variability differences and to ensure that 
participants were attending to the task. As can be seen in Table 2, participants almost 
always classified the target item as belonging to the high-variability group, consistent 
with the prediction of the Rational Model. This can be examined statistically in two ways. 
First, we can assume that factors other than category variability determine classification 
into the S1 or S2 category. In such a case, we would expect that classification of the test 
instance into the two categories will be the same, regardless of whether S1 is the more 
variable category or not. Thus, we can compare the frequency of classifications across the 
two conditions (S1 is the more variable category vs. S2 is the more variable category), 
with a chi-square test; this was found to be highly significant (Chi-square (1) = 8.82, p < 
.05). Second, we can examine the probability of classifying into the more variable 
category (regardless of whether this is S1 or S2), against a null hypothesis of chance 
classification into the more or less variable category. That is, this second approach does 





not consider classification into S1 vs. S2 as the main dependent variable, but rather 
classification into the more variable vs. less variable category as the main dependent 
variable. A binomial distribution can be used to compute the probability of how likely it 
is to obtain k classifications into the more variable category, out of n, assuming an equal 
probability of classifying into the more and less variable categories. This probability was 
p=.001, so the null hypothesis that there is an equal classification probability into the less 
and more variable categories can be rejected. In other words, when S1 was the high 
variability category, the test instance tended to be classified to S1 and when S2 was the 
high variability category, the test instance tended to be classified to S2. 
 
Insert Table 2 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1 we found that participants classified a test instance halfway between the 
prototypes of a low and a high variability category to the more variable category. 
However, no actual stimuli were presented. Such a manipulation was considered worth 
exploring in that it provided the closest possible match between the stimuli participants 
saw (the numbers in Table 1) and the input to Anderson’s (1991) Rational Model. In 
Experiment 2, we adopted a more standard procedure, so as to examine the generality of 
the findings from Experiment 1. Half of the participants received only verbal descriptions 
of the categories (that is, participants would see Tables 1a and 1b, as in Experiment 1), 
without any actual stimuli, and the other half received both the verbal descriptions and a 
set of actual objects (which were schematic spider-like forms).  
Methods 






The population sample consisted of 109 participants, Swansea University undergraduates, 
who volunteered to take part in the study. Of these, 59 were presented with both the 
actual object and a verbal description and 54 participants were presented with only the 
verbal description.  
Procedure and stimuli  
Stimuli were constructed on the basis of the values on Tables 1a and 1b which looked 
like spider-like schematic drawings (Figure 3; note that there was a second set of stimuli 
corresponding to the counterbalancing of the values in Table 1, as discussed for 
Experiment 1). The length of the legs and the length of the bodies corresponded to 
number of body parts and leg parts in the drawings. For example, in Figure 3 the spider 
on the left has four body segments (parts) and six leg segments. Additionally, together 
with each spider stimulus, the number of leg and body parts were presented verbally as 
well. For example, the spider on the right of Figure 3 was presented with the label “2 
body parts and 4 legs parts”. All of the stimuli in a group (S1 or S2) were presented on 
the same sheet of paper. 
 
Insert Figure 3 
  
Participants received their instructions printed on an A4 sheet of paper. In the first 
condition, participants were presented with both the physical stimuli and the 
corresponding verbal labels. Once participants indicated that they had read and 
understood the instructions, they were given a second sheet (the stimuli in the S1 group) 





with the actual stimuli and their verbal descriptions and then with a third sheet (the 
stimuli in the S2 group; in all cases, the intended classifications were indicated). Note 
that the physical size of the stimuli was such that all the stimuli in each group could fit 
onto a single A4 sheet. The question regarding category variability and the classification 
of the item were asked in a final sheet, as has been the case in Experiment 1. The second 
condition was identical, but for the fact that participants saw only the verbal descriptions 
of the stimuli (this applies to the test stimulus as well).  
 
Results 
As can be seen in Table 3, participants who were presented with objects and verbal 
descriptions, were more likely to classify the intermediate item in the high variability 
category (Chi-square (1) = 13.665, p < .01; Binomial probability of chance classification 
was found to be .0002). Accordingly, when S1 was the high variability category, 
participants tended to classify the test item as belonging to that S1 group and when S2 
was the high variability category, participants tended to classify the test item as belonging 
to the S2 group. Similar results were found for participants who were presented only with 
the linguistic descriptions, so that, as shown in Table 3, participants were more likely to 
classify the intermediate item in the high variability category (Chi-square (1)= 21.47, p < 
.01; Binomial probability of chance classification < .00005). 
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In Table 4 we examine the effect of presenting the actual physical stimuli. It is 
clear that this manipulation had very little effect and that participants always preferred to 
classify the test item in the category that was more variable (Chi-square(1) = 1.18, p > 
.1). In other words, participants’ classification preferences were the same regardless of 
whether training items were presented only verbally or with verbal descriptions combined 
with actual pictures of the stimuli. The conclusion from both Experiments 1 and 2 is that 
when the variability of a category is made salient, participants classify a test stimulus 
halfway between the category prototypes in the more variable category, consistently with 
the predictions from the Rational Model.  
 
Insert Table 4 
 
Experiment 3 
A key aspect in the procedure for Experiments 1 and 2 was that category variability was 
made salient in a number of ways (the stimuli were shown concurrently and were 
composed of segments which made stimulus differences obvious, participants were asked 
a question regarding category variability, and there was zero variability in one category). 
In Experiment 3, we investigated a design analogous to that of Experiments 1 and 2, but 
where category variability was less salient. This was achieved with the use of somewhat 
different stimuli (they were not composed of segments), dropping the question in the test 
phase relating to category variability, and using a sequential presentation procedure.  
As discussed, previous, related research which employed a sequential stimulus 
presentation has led to mixed results. Cohen et al. (2001) and Sakamoto et al. (2008) 





observed that an NN-halfway critical instance was more likely to be classified into the 
high variability category. By contrast, Stewart and Chater (2002) did not observe 
classification into the high variability category with a sequential presentation; such a 
result was obtained only when the stimuli were presented concurrently (as in our 
Experiment 2). Note, however, that all these studies employed a fairly extensive 
supervised categorization procedure. With this experiment, we were interested in 
categories which would be highly intuitive, so that a single presentation of the stimuli 
would (or should) readily enable participants to understand them. This is a significant 
consideration in this context, because the Rational Model is a model of unsupervised 
categorization, so that it cannot learn categories on the basis of feedback. Thus, the 
natural application of the Rational Model would be such that the intended categories are 
spontaneously recognized.  
Finally, it is worth confirming the predictions of the Rational Model for the 
Experiment 3 stimuli (Table 5). For c=0.1 all items were assigned to their own clusters, 
for c=1 all items were assigned to the same group. For c=0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 
between five and three clusters were produced and in all cases the P-halfway instance 
was individually classified. For c=0.8, 0.9 the intended two-cluster classification was 
produced and in both cases the P-halfway critical test instance was assigned to the more 
variable category. In other words, the Rational Model’s prediction is unchanged: the 









Participants were 66 Swansea undergraduates University students, who volunteered to 
take part in the study.  
Stimuli  
Stimuli were spider-like schematic drawings, analogous, but not identical, to the ones 
used in Experiment 2 (see Figure 4). The length of the legs and the length of the bodies 
were mapped to the values in Tables 5 by assuming a Weber fraction of about 8%; such a 
Weber fraction is a reasonable estimate for our stimulus dimensions, since they 
effectively correspond to lengths (e.g., Morgan, 2005). Moreover, as in other 
experiments, we counterbalanced whether the low variability category consisted of 
‘small’ or ‘large’ stimuli. These considerations increase our confidence that the assumed 
representation was the actual psychological one, though we did not carry out a more 
detailed examination of this issue (as, e.g., Cohen et al., 2001). The range of actual 
lengths for both legs and bodies was the same, and it was 0 mm (when there was no body 
or legs) to 76.1 mm. The smallest actual length (when it was 1) of a body or leg was 20 
mm. In this experiment, each stimulus was printed individually onto a sheet of paper, 
which was cropped to be as large as the stimulus; stimuli were subsequently laminated. 
Finally, in this experiment, we created two new low/ high variability categories, as seen 
in Table 5. Table 5 corresponds to stimuli such that the low variability category 
corresponds to low exemplars with generally low physical values and the high variability 
category corresponds to exemplars with high physical values. Another set of stimuli was 
created by reversing the correspondence between physical values and category 
variability; this was done so as to counterbalance whether the prototype of the low 





variability category was ‘larger’ or smaller than the prototype of the high variability 
category. In all cases, the test item was a P-halfway item.. 
 
Insert Figure 4 
 
Procedure 
Participants were first told that they would be presented with two groups of objects and 
that the objects differed in terms of the length of the bodies and the length of the legs; 
two examples of possible objects were then shown to illustrate the critical dimensions. 
They were also told that each of the two groups had eight members. The experimenter 
then started showing to participants the members of each group one by one. Each 
stimulus was printed on a laminated card and the stimulus order was the same as that on 
Table 5 (a or b; likewise for the alternative set of values, corresponding to the 
counterbalancing mentioned above). Once a stimulus had been shown, it was taken away. 
Finally, participants were told that they would have to decide to which group they wanted 
to assign a test stimulus they were about to see. Following the question, the test stimulus 
was presented and participants indicated their response orally to the experimenter. 
 
 Insert Table 5 
 
Results 
As can be seen in Table 6, participants tended to classify the target item as belonging to 
the less variable group (Chi-square (1) = 3.956, p < .05; Binomial probability of chance 
classification = 0.014). In other words, when category S1 was the more variable one, 





participants tended to classify the test item as belonging to category S2, and likewise for 
category S2. 
 
Insert Table 6 
 
 Experiment 4  
Experiment 1, 2, and 3 provide conflicting intuitions regarding whether classification into 
the more variable category is always favored or not. It appears that classification into the 
more variable category has to do with the extent to which differences in category 
variability are made salient or not. In Experiment 3, although the two categories did differ 
in relative variability, there were several manipulations which were introduced to 
undermine the ability of participants to perceive the relative variability of the two 
categories. Specifically, in Experiment 3 the low variability category did not have zero 
variability, the question about variability (which was meant to function as a hint that the 
two categories differed in variability) was not included, and, finally, the stimuli were 
sequentially presented and were not made of individual segments (in Experiments 1, 2 the 
stimuli were made of individual segments, so as to make any differences between 
different stimuli more salient). Under such conditions, there was a preference to classify 
the P-halfway instance into the less variable category.  
 We would like to understand in more detail the factors which contribute to the 
perception of a difference in category variability. In Experiment 4, we employed stimuli 
identical to those of Experiment 2 (spider-like images, composed of segments). The low 
variability category had zero variability. And the question about variability was included. 





But the stimuli in Experiment 4 were presented sequentially, instead of concurrently on a 
single sheet of paper (as in other experiments, participants were told the intended 
categories). Thus, there was a single difference between Experiment 2 and Experiment 4, 
namely that in the latter experiment the stimuli were presented sequentially. Sequential 
presentation is one of the factors which has been highlighted in previous research as 
encouraging classification into the less variable category (Stewart & Chater, 2002). 
Indeed, in Experiment 3, which employed sequential presentation, there was a bias to 
classify in the less variable category. Thus, with Experiment 4 we try to isolate the 
importance of sequential vs. concurrent presentation regarding the bias to classify into the 
more variable category.  
Methods 
We recruited 40 experimentally naïve participants from the undergraduate population of 
the Ben-Gurion University. The stimuli were identical to those of Experiment 2. The 
procedure was identical to that of Experiment 3, that is, each stimulus (with its intended 
category label) was individually presented to participants. As this experiment was run in 
Israel, all materials were translated in Hebrew.  
Results 
As can be seen in Table 7, participants tended to classify the target item as belonging to 
the more variable group (Chi-square (1) = 12.91, p < .05; Binomial probability of chance 
classification = 0.0002). In other words, when category S1 was the more variable one, 
participants tended to classify the test item as belonging to category S1, and likewise for 
category S2. This result clearly shows that a change in presentation format, from 





concurrent to sequential, is in itself insufficient to overcome the bias to classify a P- 
halfway test item into the more variable category.  
 
Insert Table 7 
Experiment 5 
In Experiments 1, 2 and Experiment 3 we observed a bias for classification into the more 
and less variable categories respectively, but Experiments 1, 2 differed from Experiment 
3 in several ways. Experiment 4 rules out one of the possible relevant differences 
between Experiments 1, 2 and Experiment 3. Namely, Experiment 4 showed that even 
with a sequential presentation it is possible to obtain the bias for classification into the 
more variable category. However, Experiment 4 still differs from Experiment 3 in several 
ways. In Experiment 4, the less variable category still had zero variability (in Experiment 
3 it did not), the stimuli were composed of segments (in Experiment 3 they did not), and 
the question about variability was included (in Experiment 3 it did not). Thus, there are 
several factors which might be contributing to overcome the bias for classification into 
the more variable category in Experiment 3.  
 Experiment 5 was designed to examine another one of these factors, specifically 
the question (hint) about variability. Previous researchers had noted that providing a hint 
regarding the difference in variability between the two categories increased classification 
of an NN-halfway test item into the more variable category (Stewart & Chater, 2002; see 
also Smith & Sloman, 1994; Sakamoto et al., 2008). In the present series of experiments, 
such a hint had the form of asking participants which category was more variable. Is this 
question about variability a critical factor in encouraging classification into the more 





variable category? Experiment 5 was identical to Experiment 4, but the question about 
category variability was dropped. (Recall, Experiment 4 was identical to Experiment 2, 
but for the fact that in Experiment 4 the stimuli were sequentially presented, while in 
Experiment 2 presentation was concurrent.) 
Methods 
We recruited 40 experimentally naïve participants from the undergraduate population of 
the Ben-Gurion University. The stimuli and procedure were identical to those of 
Experiment 4, but for the fact that the question about category variability was not 
included. As this experiment was run in Israel, all materials were translated in Hebrew. 
Results 
As can be seen in Table 8, participants tended to classify the target item as belonging to 
the more variable group but the results were not significant (Chi-square (1) = 1.76, p > .1; 
Binomial probability of chance classification = 0.057). In other words, the results of 
Experiment 5 are exactly in between the results of Experiment 1, 2, and 4 and the results 
of Experiment 3. Experiment 5 shows that not including the question about category 
variability is an important factor in whether participants classify into the more variable 
category or not.  
 
Insert Table 8 
General discussion 
The empirical objective of this study was to reassess some of the conclusions regarding 
the impact of category variability on the classification of instances halfway between two 
categories. There are different ways in which a halfway instance can be defined. We 





chose to focus on test instances halfway between prototypes (P-halfway instances), 
because prototypes are undeniably important characteristics of a category. By contrast, 
some researchers have considered test instances halfway between the nearest neighbors 
of two categories (NN-halfway instances). We were reluctant to adopt this alternative 
approach. The nearest neighbors between two categories would be the least typical 
members of the categories (in statistical terms, they might be outliers, though whether 
they are outliers or not would depend on the overall distributional characteristics of the 
relevant categories). Therefore, their importance in the classification of new instances is 
debatable. Even though standard exemplar models do not specifically weigh some 
category members more than others, whether this is indeed the case or not has yet to 
come under close empirical scrutiny.  
 Our experiments were designed to incorporate a number of factors which may 
impact on classification into the more variable category. These factors were: the form of 
the stimuli (whether they were made of segments or not; in the former case, stimulus 
differences would be more salient), stimulus presentation format (concurrent vs. 
sequential), the variability of the low variability category (if it is zero, then presumably 
the difference in variability between the low and the high variability categories is more 
obvious), and a question about which category was more variable (this was meant to 
encourage participants to appreciate that there was a difference in the variabilities of the 
two categories). Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to have in place several of the 
factors thought to encourage participants to appreciate the difference in the variability of 
the two categories. In these cases, we found that a test instance halfway between the two 
category prototypes tended to be classified to the more variable category. By contrast, in 





Experiment 3 most of these factors were eliminated, leading to a preference for  
classifying the halfway test instance as belonging to  the low variability category.  
Experiments 4 and 5 were designed to explore in more detail the conditions which 
make it more likely that a P-halfway test instance would be classified into the more 
variable category. Experiment 4 was identical to Experiment 2, but for the fact that the 
stimuli were presented sequentially instead of concurrently. We found that in Experiment 
4 classification into the more variable category was still favored. Experiment 5 was 
identical to Experiment 4 but for the fact that the question about variability was dropped. 
In that case the results showed no significant bias to classify in the low or high variability 
category. Thus, Experiments 4 and 5 provide a graded picture for how the pattern of 
results in Experiment 2 eventually lead to the pattern of results in Experiment 3 and 
highlight the relative importance of the corresponding experiment characteristics. Table 9 
provides a summary of the experiments and key results.   
 
Insert Table 9  
 
This pattern of results is partly consistent with previous relevant research. For 
example, as with previous researchers, we concluded that in general when the difference 
in variability between two categories was made salient, the test instance was more likely 
to be classified in the more variable category (Sakamoto et al., 2008; Smith & Sloman, 
1994; Stewart & Chater, 2002). We also confirmed the importance of a hint regarding the 
difference in variability between the two categories (Stewart & Chater, 2002). But, we 
could not conclude that sequential vs. concurrent presentation is a critical consideration 





in undermining the assumed bias to classify a halfway instance into the more variable 
category (Stewart & Chater, 2002).  
It is worth providing a brief consideration of why we observed a bias for 
classification into the less variable category in Experiment 3, though a full examination 
of this issue is beyond the scope of our work. One possibility is that the processing of 
non-identical stimuli when presented sequentially does not lead to memory traces that are 
stable enough and detailed enough, for participants to get an accurate sense of differences 
in category variability, or, indeed an accurate sense of the categories themselves. Under 
such circumstances, maybe the low variability category is favored for the classification of  
the test instance simply because it is learned better (or, because for the low variability 
category participants find it easier to come up with a heuristic rule to represent it; cf. 
Ashby et al., 1998). That is, classification results in Experiment 3 may depend not on 
which category is more or less variable, but rather on which category had been better 
acquired.   
 Experiment 3 was actually the only experiment in which the low category 
variability had non-zero variability. Is this a critical factor in terms of the preference for 
the low variability category we observed in this experiment? We think this is unlikely. 
First, there is no theory as to why zero variability would be qualitatively different from 
low, but non-zero variability. Second, even given the fact that the stimuli in the low 
variability category were identical, it is arguable as to whether the psychological 
representations of the stimuli were exactly identical as well. Participants probably felt the 
stimuli were nearly the same, but to establish exact identity closer scrutiny would be 
required (note that this is our speculation, we did not specifically assess this issue). Thus, 





our tentative suggestion is that a difference between zero and low variability is only one 
of the factors making a difference in the variability of categories salient, and does not 
impact on participant performance in another way.  
To sum up, our results add support for the view that classification of a P-halfway 
test instance is more likely to be in a high variability category, as opposed to a low 
variability one, as long as the difference in category variability is salient. Our results 
complement the considerable related literature on NN-halfway test instances and 
consolidate some of the intuitions regarding when it is more likely for classification into 
the more variable category to occur.  
We also explored the predictions from the  Rational Model of categorization 
(Anderson, 1991; Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2010), which is the predominant 
Bayesian model of categorization. We implemented the continuous version of the 
Rational Model, which clearly predicts that a P-halfway test item will be classified into 
the more variable category. It is worth noting that this prediction holds across a wide 
range of manipulations of its main parameter, the coupling parameter. Our results are 
mostly consistent with the Rational Model, since participants did indeed typically classify 
the P-halfway test instance into the more variable category. This suggests that perhaps the 
bias for classification of P-halfway instances into the more variable category could arise 
because of a representation of the distributional properties of category exemplars and an 
assessment of new instances in terms of such distributional properties. However, the 
Rational Model cannot explain, for example, the results in Experiment 3, whereby 
participants favored classification into the less variable category. We can speculate as to 
which assumptions of the Rational Model could be relaxed to account for the Experiment 





3 result. The most obvious culprit is the assumption regarding the input to the model. As 
noted above, perhaps the sequential presentation of the stimuli did not allow participants 
to develop the intended categories or appreciate the differences in the variability of 
categories (note that the Rational Model, and other related computational models, have 
no straightforward way to formalize this idea). However, as also noted, we cannot 
preclude the possibility that there are restrictions in the applicability of the psychological 
processes assumed by the Rational Model and that, in some cases, alternative 
categorization modes are engaged (cf. Ashby et al., 1998).  
 Nosofsky (1991) argued that certain versions of exemplar theory are consistent 
with the predictions of the Rational Model (for his argument he employed a precursor to 
the GCM). So, one would expect that predictions from the GCM would (typically) 
converge with predictions from the Rational Model. But, as noted, Cohen et al. (2001) 
found that a slightly reduced version of the GCM was not consistent with a bias for 
classification into the more variable category, at least for NN-halfway instances. What is 
the situation for P-halfway instances? Rather than fit the GCM to participant data, as has 
been the case for our examination of the Rational Model, we believe a more informative 
analysis of the model’s properties would be provided by an idealized situation whereby 
the P-halfway instance (e.g., in Table 1a) is assigned with 100% probability to either the 
low or the high variability category—an examination of the model’s sum of squares 
(SoS) error for the alternative classifications will reveal the model’s bias regarding more 
vs. less variable categories.  
We explored the full version of the GCM, subject only to the requirement that the 
category bias parameters be equal (cf. Cohen et al., 2001).  The similarity function 





parameter was constrained to be between 1 and 2 (since the exponential and Gaussian 
similarity functions have been the only ones which have been supported in the literature) 
and the Minkowski power metric parameter was constrained to be between 1 and 2 as 
well (since the City block and Euclidean metrics are likewise the only ones which have 
been advocated as psychologically relevant). Attentional weights were allowed to vary 
freely between 0 and 1, subject to a constraint that they sum to 1. Finally, the upper limit 
of the sensitivity parameter was manipulated (with perfectly linear categories and perfect 
classification probabilities, the GCM will nearly always favor the max allowed value of 
the sensitivity parameter; Pothos & Bailey, 2009). For the Table 1a stimuli, we examined 
upper limits for the sensitivity parameter of 100, 50, 10, and 5, 1, and 0.5, and in all cases 
the SoS error was higher when the P-halfway instance was assigned to the low variability 
category than when it was assigned to the high variability category. Analogous results 
were obtained for the Table 3 stimuli.  
These results show that for our stimulus sets the GCM favors classification of a P-
halfway test instance into the more variable category. Intuitively, the GCM favors 
classification into a more variable category for P-halfway instances because of its 
exponentially decaying similarity function. A P-halfway test instance will be closer to the 
nearest neighbor from the high variability category, than the low variability one. 
Moreover, an exponentially decaying similarity function means that classification of the 
test instance will be more heavily influenced by near instances, while the influence of 
instances further away will rapidly (exponentially) diminish. The consistency of the 
Rational Model and the GCM in relation to P-halfway instances highlights the inter-
relatedness of the two models (Nosofsky, 1991).  





In conclusion, we presented several new experiments regarding classification 
biases for a test instance halfway between the prototypes of two categories and examined 
the predictions from two important categorization models. The emerging conclusion is 
that there is a bias for classification into the more variable category, although this bias 
disappears when it can be assumed that there is reduced opportunity for participants to 
perceive the difference in variability between the two categories. This conclusion is 
partly consistent with the Rational Model and the GCM.   
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The tables below show the test items and their dimensions, exactly as presented to participants in 
Experiment 1. The test items were supposed to correspond to hypothetical spiders. Low values correspond 
to exemplars from the low variability category.  
a. 
Group name Length of body in millimeters Length of legs in millimeters 
1. S1 3  5  
2. S1 3  5  
3. S1 3  5 
4. S1 3  5 
5. S1 3  5 
6. S1 3  5 
7. S1 3  5 
8. S1 3  5 
9. S1 3  5 
   
1. S2 8  6 
2. S2 7  5 
3. S2 6  4 
4. S2 8  6 
5. S2 7  5 
6. S2 6  4 
7. S2 8  6 
8. S2 7  5 
9. S2 6  4 
   
Test item (S2) 5 5 
 
b. 
Group name Length of body in millimeters Length of legs in millimeters 
1. S1 8  6 
2. S1 7  5  
3. S1 6  4 
4. S1 8  6 
5. S1 7 5 
6. S1 6 4 
7. S1 8  6 
8. S1 7  5 
9. S1 6  4 
   
1. S2 3 5 
2. S2 3 5 
3. S2 3  5 
4. S2 3  5 
5. S2 3  5 
6. S2 3  5 
7. S2 3  5 
8. S2 3 5 
9. S2 3 5 
   
Test item (S1) 5 5 






Table 2  
Classification of the test item in Experiment 1. Here and for all other tables reporting 
empirical results cell numbers correspond to number of participants classifying the test 




 Test item was classified as S1: Test item was classified as S2: 
S1 is high variability  10 2 
S2 is high variability 2 8 







Classification of the test item for participants who were presented with actual stimuli and 
linguistic descriptions or just the linguistic descriptions in Experiment 2.  
 
  
Participants saw actual stimuli and linguistic descriptions 
 Test item was classified 
as S1: 
Test item was classified as 
S2: 
S1 is high variability  24 12 
S2 is high variability  4 19 
Participants saw only linguistic descriptions 
S1 is high variability 18 3 
S2 is high variability 7 26 





Table 4  
Classification of the test item, depending on whether participants saw pictures of the 
stimuli or not in Experiment 2.  




 The more variable category The less variable category 
Actual stimuli shown  43 16 
Only linguistic labels 44 10 





Table 5. Length of legs and length of bodies for the stimuli in Experiment 3. Note that in this 
experiment participants only saw the actual stimuli. SD is standard deviation, which is a measure 
of variability of the members of the two categories. In this design, the test item is predicted to be 
classified to category B by the rational model.  
a. 
Group name Length of body Length of legs 
1. A 0 1 
2. A 1 2 
3. A 1 0 
4. A 2 1 
5. A 1.5 1.5 
6. A 1 1 
7. A 1.5 1 
8. A 1 1.5 
SD 0.582482 0.582482 
Mean 1.125 1.125 
   
1. B 8 10 
2. B 10 8 
3. B 9 10 
4. B 10 9 
5. B 8 9.5 
6. B 9.5 8 
7. B 8.5 10 
8. B 10 8.5 
SD 0.876275 0.876275 
Mean 9.125 9.125 
Test item (B)                5.125               5.125 
b. 
Group name Length of body Length of legs 
1. B 8 10 
2. B 10 8 
3. B 9 10 
4. B 10 9 
5. B 8 9.5 
6. B 9.5 8 
7. B 8.5 10 
8. B 10 8.5 
SD 0.876275 0.876275 
Mean 9.125 9.125 
   
1. A 0 1 
2. A 1 2 
3. A 1 0 
4. A 2 1 
5. A 1.5 1.5 
6. A 1 1 
7. A 1.5 1 
8. A 1 1.5 
SD 0.582482 0.582482 
Mean 1.125 1.125 
Test item (B)                5.125               5.125 






Classification of the test item in Experiment 3. 
 
  
 Test item was classified as 
S1 
Test item was classified as 
S2 
Category S1 is more 
variable 
14 21 
Category S2 is more 
variable 
20 11 






Table 7  
Classification of the test item in Experiment 4.  
 
  
 Test item was classified as S1: Test item was classified as S2: 
S1 is high variability  18 2 
S2 is high variability 7 13 






Table 8  
Classification of the test item in Experiment 5.  
 
  
 Test item was classified as S1: Test item was classified as S2: 
S1 is high variability  9 11 
S2 is high variability 5 15 















Table of values 
Question of which 
category was more 
variable  




Condition 1 Table of values 
Question of which 
category was more 
variable  





Table of values and 
actual stimuli 
Question of which 
category was more 
variable  





Size of stimuli directly 
indicated 
      
Experiment 3 




Table of values and 
actual stimuli 
Question of which 
category was more 
variable  





Size of stimuli directly 
indicated 
      
Experiment 5 Table of values and 
actual stimuli 
Size of stimuli directly 
indicated 
Zero variability  Sequential  No significant result 
 
  







Figure 1. Point X is halfway between the prototypes of the two categories, while point Y indicates the point halfway between the 
nearest neighbors of the two categories. It can be seen that point Y is closer to the prototype of the less variable category.  
 
Figure 2. An illustration of why the Rational Model favors the more variable category when classifying a test instance halfway 
between the prototypes of the two categories. The test instance is more likely given the distribution of the more variable category.  
 
Figure 3. An example of the stimuli that were presented to the participants in Experiment 2.  
 
Figure 4. An example of the stimuli presented to participants in Experiment 3. The body is the black thick line in the middle and the 
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